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SUBJECT: Conversation with Khrushchev June 25 Concerning Germany and Berlin

## LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

Supplementing my referenced cable, Khrushchev told me he had no desire to try to separate the Western allies from each other and that he would like to get along well not only with us but with our friends, even including the West Germans. Then he proceeded, however, to make contemptuous remarks about Chancellor Adenauer.

When he said that a united Germany would join NATO and that the Soviets had no illusions on this point, I remarked that this might be true but was a problem which could be dealt with and which we were prepared to examine in all sincerity. There had been many statements by high American officials to the effect that we sought no military advantage from the reunification of Germany.

When Khrushchev said that Adenauer and Ulbricht could never agree and implied that we should accept the indefinite division of Germany, I said the real problem was that the Soviets appeared unwilling ever to allow a country which had gone Communist to change its mind and revert to a capitalist system. When he did not dispute this I went on to say that this raised a fundamental problem in our relations and one which would always keep us at odds. So long as the Soviets followed such a policy that Communism was a one-way street, we would be obliged to oppose Communism or any steps in that direction wherever they developed. I said that as matters now stood, once a country became Communist it appeared that the whole power of the Communist Bloc would be used to maintain it in the Bloc. I could imagine a case where a country might wish to try a socialistic or Communist experiment but if it meant it was irrevocably to remain Communist despite the wishes of its people, then we must be obliged to oppose such a development; otherwise the Communists would eventually achieve their goal of world domination.

In discussing the Western proposals at Geneva regarding Berlin, I spelled out in detail the concessions which the West had made. In commenting on this Khrushchev appeared to recognize that we had in fact made a genuine effort to meet the Soviet point of view, but he made clear that nothing would satisfy him that failed to perpetuate the division of Germany.

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L. Thompson: cmg

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Llewellyn E. Thompson  
Llewellyn E. Thompson

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